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• How developing countries have been able to 
meet the challenges of globalisation and are 
able to access markets for their agricultural and 
natural resources products 
• Markets in rich countries and in regional trade 
partners 
• Impact of multilateral agreements of World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) 
– ‘SPS Agreement’ 
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– Concepts of standards and risk -  application in developing countries 
– Transparency and Trade Facilitation   
– Risk assessment vs. risk analysis 
• National legal frameworks for biosecurity in developing countries – where 
reform needed 
• Lessons learned in drafting - how to remove barriers to further reform 
• Equitability, democracy and terms of trade   
• International trade and environmental protection  
• Conclusions/Footnote on Brexit and plurilateral trade agreements 
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Biosecurity defined 
From Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United 
Nations (FAO): 
"Biosecurity is composed of three sectors, namely food 
safety, plant health and life, and animal life and health. 
These sectors include food production in relation to food 
safety, the introduction of plant pests, animal pests and 
diseases, and zoonoses, the introduction and release of 
Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) and their 
products, and the introduction and safe management of 
invasive alien species and genotypes"    (FAO, 2001).    
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Biosecurity and trade: relevance of WTO 
• The extent to which, and type of, national Biosecurity 
measures that can be adopted by a country are now 
heavily influenced by the laws of the World Trade 
Organisation. In particular, the SPS Agreement requires 
Member States to ensure that relevant adopted 
measures, including laws and regulations related to, for 
example, quarantine requirements, internal surveillance 
measures and import requirements, are not protectionist 
in nature and should be as least trade restrictive as 
possible.  
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Other frameworks for biosecurity 
• Multilateral Environment Agreements (MEAs) 
Convention on Biological Diversity, CITES, etc. 
• Conflicting or confusing obligations for 
contracting parties to these conventions as well 
as being WTO members 
• Trade-related environmental measures applied 
extra-territorially may not be in accord with WTO 
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Words of caution 
• French word 'biosecurité' means biosafety - 
biosecurity for GMOs 
• US usage of biosecurity – prevention of 
bioterrorism (Patriot Act) 
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WTO and barriers to trade 
• Tariff barriers – import taxes and duties, quotas, 
subsidies 
• Non-tariff measures (NTMs) 
– In biosecurity area, specific import requirements, e.g. 
criteria used to show food is safe, meat is free of 
diseases transmissible to livestock, humans and wild 
animals 
 
• NTM becomes Non-tariff barrier (NTB) if 
judged to be unduly restrictive on trade because 
unjustifiably strict or discriminatory 
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SPS Agreement – Trade by standards 
The SPS Agreement provides a normative framework to ensure that sanitary 
and phytosanitary (SPS) measures are not unduly restrictive of trade 
because they are not based on scientific evidence/risk assessment (Articles 
2,5) or they are discriminatory (Article 2).   
Scientific basis of/scientific evidence for SPS measures 
• International Standards as basis for ‘SPS measures’ (and standards are 
measures themselves) play a key part in ensuring that NTMs are not 
NTBs. 
• Otherwise, scientific evidence to justify SPS measure as NTM provided by 
risk assessment 
• Confusion between or merging of 'standards' for quality and safety in 
some jurisdictions 
• Prevailing lack of capacity for risk assessment is most serious barrier to 
reform of biosecurity legislation in developing countries 
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Some biosecurity hazards posing biosecurity risks 
Sector Commodity Hazard 
Human health/food safety Food – fresh and processed (Chemical) contaminant: pesticides, 
antibiotics, heavy metals, nitrates, 
food additives and adulterants 
    Food-borne pathogens -  bacteria 
(Salmonella, E. coli, etc. 
Zoonoses (e.g. brucellosis), viruses, 
parasites 
    Physical hazards – glass, stones, 
metal fragments, etc. 
Animal health/veterinary Meat and animal products Contaminants, feed-borne 
pathogens and physical hazards as 
above in animal feed 
    Animal diseases 
  Eggs, semen for breeding Animal diseases 
Plant health Fresh fruit and vegetables Plant pests – bacteria, fungi, 
viruses, phytoplasmas, insects, 
molluscs, mites, rodents, etc.   Packing material 
  Planting material for propagation – 
seeds, bulbs, tubers, roots, cuttings 
Habitats and biodiversity Potentially invasive plants and 
animals deliberately imported 
Invasive, predatory 
  GMOs?   
Are SPS standards voluntary or mandatory? 
• Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) 
– Technical Regulations (specifications for imported goods) 
– mandatory 
– Standards (as basis for TRs) are ‘voluntary’ 
• SPS Standards are official standards, concept of voluntary or 
mandatory does not apply 
• In SPS Agreement, standards are ‘measures’ 
• International Standards are set by international bodies, e.g. 
Codex Alimentarius (WHO/FAO) for food safety 
• SPS measures and Technical Regulations are mutually 
exclusive 
• Role of National Standards Institution in SPS? 
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SPS food standards are ‘Western standards’ 
• Critics of WTO and globalisation claim that SPS 
standards were developed for western countries 
• Too high or not affordable in developing countries 
• But Codex expert committees comprise members from 
developed and developing countries. Standards adopted 
by consensus. 
• Disparity between export driven food production 
compliant with importing country standards and lack of 
domestic food safety safeguards is alarming, particularly 
products that fail to make the grade for export find their 
way on to the domestic market even though they may be 
unsafe.  
• Indicates neglect of universal right to safe food? 
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Need for reform of biosecurity legislation in developing 
countries 
Concepts of safe food 
 1. Basic principle is that food that is not safe should not be 
placed on the market or withdrawn from the market if necessary. 
Then criteria for unsafe food (Codex): 
Injurious to health, or 
Unfit for human consumption (spoiled, passed sell by date, etc.) 
2. Whether is food injurious to health must be determined by risk 
assessment of the potential hazards causing food poisoning or 
physical injury. This requires knowing what the hazards are for 
each type of food - food-borne bacteria, pesticides, etc. 
• Important to restrict legislative matters to safety, avoiding 
‘quality’ issues 
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Food controls in FSU/CIS 
Dual system operating: 
• Import criteria (SanPin) more or less safety factors although 
some obsolescence 
• GOST for market access 
GOST stands for ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫЙ СТАНДАРТ 
[State Standards] with standards primarily for quality/composition 
as Technical Regulations but also incorporating some (obsolete) 
safety factors (e.g. DDT in bread). Linked with certification of 
conformity - major problem - authorities using this system for rent 
seeking with all the accompanying problems of corruption.  
• In the West, quality/composition is not an SPS matter (except 
sometimes for vulnerable consumers). 
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Hazards Analysis and Critical Control Points 
(HACCP) 
• HACCP is the basic food control system promoted by 
Codex as the normative requirement 
• Responsibility is placed on food producers or processors 
to ensure safe and hygienic production by ensuring 
reliable and safe inputs and identification and elimination 
of hazards during the processes. There is no routine 
certification but there will be monitoring of e.g., 
pesticides, and primary producers are required to 
observe Good Agricultural Practice. 
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Progress on reform of food controls in CIS 
BLACK, R., KIREEVA, I. (2015). Sanitary and phytosanitary issues for 
the Customs Union of Russian Federation, Belarus and Kazakhstan in 
relation to trade with other countries and CIS, with special reference to 
food of non-animal origin and phytosanitary controls. Journal of World 
Trade 49 (5) 802-836. 
KIREEVA, I., BLACK, R. (2014) Sanitary and veterinary hygiene 
requirements for imports of fish and fishery products into Russia – the 
tensions between regional integration and globalisation. ERA Forum 15 
(4) 495-418. 
BLACK, R., KIREEVA, I. (2010). General overview of the Russian 
Federation sanitary and phytosanitary legislation in light of the WTO 
SPS Agreement and EU principles of food safety.  Review of Central 
and East European Law  35 (3) 225-255. 
 
 
February 2017 SLS Biosecurity 18 
Risk in plant health legislation 
Pest risk analysis in International Plant Protection 
Convention 
• Plant health measures can only be taken against 
regulated pests (mainly ‘quarantine pests') 
• PRA is necessary to determine QPs and each country or 
harmonised region will have its own unique list of QPs 
• PRA is needed to determine the risks of importing each 
type of commodity from each country of origin and the 
consequent import requirements (restrictions, need for 
inspections, treatments, etc.) 
• PRA is needed whenever a new type of commodity 
appears 
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Consequences of weak pest risk assessment 
capacity in developing countries 
• Lack of specific detailed import requirements, country by 
country, commodity by commodity 
• Reliance on Import Permits (viewed as non-tariff barriers 
in themselves) 
• Other unnecessary requirements such as Phytosanitary 
Certificate on goods like canned vegetables, roasted 
nuts that bear no plant health risk 
• For approximation to EU Acquis, misunderstanding the 
purpose of plant passports and farm registration 
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Legislation for pesticides registration 
• Purpose is to ensure food free of harmful pesticide residues 
and to protect operators and environment 
Core legislation: 
1. Approval of active substances/active ingredients that are 
actually toxic to pests. Risk assessment is necessary to 
ensure that they are safe to use (operators, consumers, 
environment) as well as being effective against particular 
pests in particular crops 
2. Registration of formulated products actually available on 
the market for farmers to use 
• Conflicts between Ministries of Agriculture and Health over 
jurisdiction 
• Problem of generic pesticides and ‘pesticide equivalence’ 
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Is risk assessment a trade barrier? 
Risk assessment is very resource intensive: 
• Personal trained in risk assessment not just in 
professional expertise like food safety, plant health, etc. 
• Frameworks and guidelines for RA do not provide 
methodology so understanding the frameworks is no 
help in actually doing assessments. 
• Requires information resources that are often/usually 
beyond the budgets of many developing countries 
• Requires sophisticated IT 
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2. Misconceptions about the nature of 
‘scientific evidence’ in SPS Agreement – 
Articles 2 and 5 
 • Key is ‘uncertainty’ 
• Risk assessments MUST include statement of the 
degree of uncertainty. Yes, uncertainty can be quantified. 
 
If a man will begin with certainties, he shall end in doubts; 
but if he will be content to begin with doubts, he shall end in 
certainties. Francis Bacon ,The Advancement of Learning 
(1605), Book I, v, 8.  
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Risk assessment v. risk analysis 
Should ‘risk assessment’ in SPS Agreement be 
interpreted as ‘risk analysis’? 
 
Laws, like sausages, cease to inspire respect in 
proportion as we know how they are made.  John 
Godfrey Saxe, 1869 
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Transparency in SPS Agreement 
Article 7/Annex B 
• SPS National Notification Authority to collect all relevant 
legislation and administrative acts to transmit to WTO and 
trading partners 
• SPS Enquiry point to receive all enquiries about the country's 
SPS measures, particularly import requirements, from both 
trading partners and prospective traders and importers within 
the country, and to transmit to designated experts for answers 
• Neither of these provisions require legislation necessarily but 
probably the most weakly implemented of all SPS measures 
• Rivalry between different bodies from misunderstanding that 
holding these positions implies some administrative authority 
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Control Inspection and Approval Procedures 
(Article 8/Annex C) 
• Avoid procedures that are unduly lengthy or costly, or indeed unnecessary. 
• Annex C detailed guidance is linked with Trade Facilitation. These 
principle shave been incorporated into the new WTO Agreement on Trade 
Facilitation.  
• A consequence of international development programme and national 
projects on trade facilitation (World Bank, etc.) is handing over separate 
sectoral SPS inspection responsibilities to either a single SPS inspection 
agency or to Customs. Having a unified inspection force is a sensible 
measure but questions have to be asked when this agency is actually 
Customs, as has happened with some countries in FSU. This may be 
more power broking rather than logistics. In the first place there can be a 
vacuum of technical expertise on which to make risk-based decisions. 
More importantly, Customs are known to be secretive and corrupt in many 
developing countries. (Trader in one CIS member country: 'Customs are in 
the Premier League of corruption'). 
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Equitability, democracy and terms of trade 
• Does SPS Agreement promote ‘democracy’? 
The agreement itself provides an important component of democracy if 
adopted into national biosecurity legislation by removing arbitrary trade 
restictions. However, the prevailing lack of resources to implement it 
has created an inequitable division between rich and poor countries. 
On the plus side: 
• Risk assessment or adoption of international standards removes the 
opportunity for unjustified restrictive measures to go unchallenged. 
• Transparency provision means that all measures must be 
communicated to trading partners, with 'measures' embracing 
procedures and administrative provisions as well as legislation. 
• Before WTO, importing authorities did not have to reveal the 
sampling procedures so they would not say how many positive 
results would lead to rejection of a consignment. Now they do. 
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On the negative side: 
• Risk assessment is about information and information is 
power. Risk assessment can be used to erect trade 
barriers if the exporting country does not have sufficient 
capacity in this area. 
• Very poor implementation of Article 7/Annex B in many 
developing countries with lack of transparency 
detrimental to country’s own citizens 
• Lack of infrastructure for implementation: 
– Scientists across the various disciplines 
– Poorly trained inspectors 
– Laboratory facilities 
– Antiquated administrative arrangements (Article 8/Annex C) 
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Lack of political will for legislative reform 
• Very lengthy process to adopt new legislation or 
make amendments to existing primary law 
• Weak influence of responsible 'scientific' ministry at 
cabinet level 
• Elected representatives serving needs of political 
elite rather than their constituencies 
• Lack of understanding of science behind SPS 
Agreement 
• Bottlenecks in drafting in typically Attorney General’s 
department 
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International trade and risks to the environment 
• Traditionally, the SPS Agreement covered human, animal and plant 
health sectors but it is now generally accepted that certain aspects 
of environmental protection are also included implicitly 
• The primary reason is that plants are major components and indeed 
architects of most natural habitats and so anything harming plants 
may damage habitats and the homes of other creatures, plant and 
animal.  
• No longer exclusively concerned about agriculture and commercial 
forestry but protecting 'natural’ vegetation as well. Additionally, exotic 
diseases and pests can be very damaging to wild animals as well as 
livestock. 
• The normative framework for PRA under IPPC now includes 
'environmental risk' - essentially organisms, plant or animal that 
might be invasive and GMOs. This is in concordance with the CBD, 
partly to avoid risk analysis having to be done twice for protecting 
agriculture and the environment. 
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Lessons learned from biosecurity drafting – helping to 
remove barriers to further reform 
1. Where do instructions come from and who drafts? 
Lessons learned 
1. Style very local and that model laws and that normative 
frameworks like IPPC are a guide to the content but not 
the structure. Even neighbouring countries in East 
Africa can follow the IPPC but have plant health acts 
very different in style and structure  
2. I had to instruct myself and needed high level legal and 
political support  
3. Needed to be a chameleon in terms of drafting style 
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2. Avoiding ultra vires rule for regulations 
• Power of Minister to make regulations 
• Many regulations in the biosecurity area are based on 
highly technical matters 
• Possible for regulations to be ruled ultra vires because a 
subject not listed in the appropriates section of the Act 
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Lesson learned: 
3. Be detailed in specifying what regulations may be 
lawfully made by the Minister.  
(For plant health law, this means at least all the topics 
covered by the International Standards for 
Phytosanitary Measures under the IPPC – 37 at 
present with more to come.) 
 
3. Where are the regulations? 
• Regulations may be of a very technical nature (and 
include long Schedules or Annexes) 
• Drafting Regulations may not be in original contract of 
external consultant hired to draft primary legislation 
• Lack of regulations may delay passage of Bill through 
parliament 
• However, unlike primary legislation, regulations in 
different jurisdictions may be very similar 
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Lesson learned:  
4. Regulations could be transposed from normative 
frameworks or from other countries, in contrast to 
primary legislation 
Drafting in trilingual jurisdiction 
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Law on Governing of Agrochemicals 
Article 35. Drafting, consideration and adoption of this Law   
This Law was drafted in English, considered and adopted in 
Kinyarwanda.   
• Apparent from this are several significant legal inconsistencies in 
both English and French versions resulting retranslation from 
Kinyarwanda. Some examples: 
Cabinet approved text Law as enacted Issues arising 
Registrar: means the person 
appointed by the responsible 
Minister to administer the 
pesticide legislation on his 
behalf.  
 
Registrar: an officer in charge 
of drawing and managing a 
list of agrochemicals; 
[Equivalent in French) 
 
Inconsistent use of ‘registrar’, 
‘administrator’ and reference 
to ‘nearest administrative 
authority’ 
Pesticide: adopted FAO 
definition 
‘Pesticide’ not defined, only 
‘agrochemical’ 
‘Pesticide’ used throughout 
text 
‘Registration’ defined ‘Accreditation’ defined 
(English and French) 
‘Registration’ used in text 
Plant Health Protection Law Rwanda 
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Final lesson learned 
5. Not to expect much if any iterative dialogue 
even with official drafters 
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Concluding remarks on SPS Agreement 
• SPS Agreement provides the normative framework for ‘Trade 
by Standards’ but also provides basis for broader application of 
biosecurity to protect habitats and biodiversity. 
• Drafting national law in the SPS sector requires understanding 
of the underlying science. Typically the normal process of 
ministry experts instructing official drafters is lacking and even if 
there was, unlikely to be much iteration to check that the 
instructions were followed in terms of science. 
• Political barriers to legislative reform, particularly to adoption of 
risk based biosecurity measures 
• Also illustrated some of the problems with drafting legislation for 
pesticides which in my view should be included under the 
biosecurity umbrella.   
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 Legislation after Brexit 
• Continued role of Parliament in overseeing Brexit 'deal' unclear – 
Article 50 Bill 
• Great Repeal Bill to adopt 'all' EU legislation into UK law before 
'unnecessary’ legislation is removed but will Bill include Directives 
(e.g. Plant Health Directive 2000/29/EC) as well as Regulations? 
• Legislative initiatives may face further legal difficulties, particularly if 
the Government invokes 'Henry VIII' powers or continues to use 
prerogative powers 
• Whether or not people voting for Brexit in the Referendum knew 
they were voting for exit from the Single Market, this now seems 
likely. 
• Main question on SPS: 
– Will UK's biosecurity risks increase or decrease if her borders 
retract to national boundaries? 
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Brexit, Single Market and WTO 
• EU is member of WTO, not UK 
• UK was very influential in designing the legislative framework to 
apply SPS to the Single Market, especially for food safety and 
plant health 
• EU is a 'trade deal' incorporating social, labour and 
environmental standards as well as pure commodity standards 
• EU's food standards largely follow Codex guidelines and 
therefore are generally consistent with trade liberalisation 
• WTO has not abolished tariffs but sets normative levels for tariffs 
• (Plurilateral or bilateral) trade deals are struck to take  certain 
aspects  of trade outside the WTO regime 
• Concessions may be made departing from GATT/SPS standards 
but beware of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle 
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What next? 
• 'Damage limitation' may be necessary to mitigate the effects of a hard Brexit 
with the default WTO option.  
• Environmental Audit Committee: Brexit posed risks for UK farming, the 
countryside and wildlife unless ministers took concerted action to maintain 
subsidies and standards; and environmental protections could be weakened 
unless the government introduces specific legislation that is enforced and 
not moribund 'zombie' legislation 
• The Environment Secretary told the Committee in January not all of the 800 
environmental laws could be replicated. Only two-thirds of existing EU 
environmental legislation could be "rolled forward" with minimal technical 
changes, she said. 
• British farmers may be keen to continue to adhere to current food safety and 
animal health standards after Brexit but they are concerned that they could 
face competition from cheaper food from countries with lower food standards 
as a consequence of new trade deals.  
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Last words on Brexit 
• Other sources that might help answering the question ‘What 
does “falling to WTO” mean’? 
FT Brexit briefing, 25 January 
https://www.ft.com/content/a7ca5fde-e2f7-11e6-9645-c9357a75844a  
 
LSE Brexit Blog,1 February http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2017/02/01/brexit-
and-free-trade-fallacies-part-two/  
 
• Echoing the concerns of British farmers, there may be a 
confusion between food safety and quality among the general 
public. One gets what one pays for in terms of quality but food 
safety is essentially a binary matter.  If food meets the 
standards set it is safe. If not, food is unsafe. 
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